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Abstract
This paper is motivated by applications of a Census Bureau interested in releasing
aggregate socio-economic data about a large population without revealing sensitive
information about any individual. The released information can be the number
of individuals living alone, the number of cars they own, or their salary brackets.
Recent events have identified some of the privacy challenges faced by these or-
ganizations [5]. To address them, this paper presents a novel differential-privacy
mechanism for releasing hierarchical counts of individuals. The counts are reported
at multiple granularities (e.g., the national, state, and county levels) and must be
consistent across all levels. The core of the mechanism is an optimization model
that redistributes the noise introduced to achieve differential privacy in order to
meet the consistency constraints between the hierarchical levels. The key technical
contribution of the paper shows that this optimization problem can be solved in
polynomial time by exploiting the structure of its cost functions. Experimental
results on very large, real datasets show that the proposed mechanism provides im-
provements of up to two orders of magnitude in terms of computational efficiency
and accuracy with respect to other state-of-the-art techniques.
1 Introduction
The release of datasets containing sensitive information about a large number of individuals is
central to a number of statistical analysis and machine learning tasks. For instance, the US Census
Bureau publishes socio-economic information about individuals, which is then used as input to train
classifiers or predictors, release important statistics about the US population, and take decisions
relative to elections and financial aid. roles of a Census Bureau is to report group size queries, which
are especially useful to study the skewness of a distribution. For instance, in 2010, the US Census
Bureau released 33 datasets of such queries [29]. Group size queries partition a dataset in groups and
evaluate the size of each group. For instance, a group may be the households that are families of four
members, or the households owning three cars.
The challenge is to release these datasets without disclosing sensitive information about any individual
in the dataset. The confidentiality of information in the decennial census is also required by law.
Various techniques for limiting a-priori the disclosed information have been investigated in the
past, including anonymization [27] and aggregations [30]. However, these techniques have been
consistently shown ineffective in protecting sensitive data [17, 27], For instance, the US Census
Bureau confirmed [2] that the disclosure limitations used for the 2000 and 2010 censuses had serious
vulnerabilities which were exposed by the Dinur and Nissim’s reconstruction attack [9]. Additionally,
the 2010 Census group sizes were truncated due to the lack of privacy methods for protecting these
particular groups [4].
This paper addresses these limitations through the framework of Differential Privacy [10], a formal
approach to guarantee data privacy by bounding the disclosure risk of any individual participating in
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Notation Description
P The set of all users
U The set of all units (e.g., home addresses)
R The set of all regions (e.g., census blocks, states)
Z The set of all unit quantities (e.g., the number of cars a user owns)
S The set of all group sizes
T The region hierarchy
R` The set of regions in level ` of T
L The number of levels in T
N The number of group sizes, i.e., |S|
G The total count of groups, i.e.,
ř
rPR`
řN
i“1 nri for any ` P rLs
n The number of individuals in the dataset
nrs The number of groups of size s in region r
nr The vector of group sizes for region r
ars A node in the DP tree associated to region r and group size s
τ rs The cost table associated to node a
r
s
τ rs pvq The cost value of τ rs associated to value v
φrs The contribution of a
r
s children costs tables
Drs The domain associated to node a
r
s
chprq The set of children regions of region r in T
paprq The parent region of region r in T
Table 1: Important symbols adopted in the paper.
a dataset. Differential privacy is considered the de-facto standard for privacy protection and has been
adopted by various corporations [12, 28] and governmental agencies [1]. Importantly, the 2020 US
Census will use an approach to disclosure avoidance that satisfies the notion of Differential Privacy
[5].
Differential privacy works by injecting carefully calibrated noise to the data before release. However,
whereas this process guarantees privacy, it also affects the fidelity of the released data. In particular,
the injected noise often produces datasets that violate consistency constraints of the application
domain. In particular, group size queries must be consistent in a geographical hierarchy, e.g., the
national, state, and county levels. Unfortunately, the traditional injection of independent noise to the
group sizes cannot ensure the consistency of hierarchical constraints.
To overcome this limitation, this paper casts the problem of privately releasing group size data as a
constraint optimization problem that ensures consistency of the hierarchical dependencies. However,
the optimization problem that redistributes noise optimally is intractable for real datasets involving
hundreds of millions of individuals. In fact, even its convex relaxation, which does not guarantee
consistency, is challenging computationally. This paper addresses these challenges by proposing
mechanisms based on a dynamic programming scheme that leverages both the hierarchical nature of
the problem and the structure of the objective function.
Paper Contributions The contributions of the paper are summarized as follows: (1) The paper
discusses the Privacy-preserving Group Size Release (PGSR) problem, for releasing differentially
private group sizes that preserves hierarchical consistency. (2) It proposes several differentially
private mechanisms that rely on an optimization approach to release both accurate and consistent
group sizes. (3) It shows that the differentially private mechanisms can be implemented in polynomial
time, using a dynamic program that exploits the hierarchical nature of group size queries, the structure
of the objective functions, and cumulative counts. (4) Finally, it evaluates the mechanisms on very
large datasets containing over 300,000,000 individuals. The results demonstrate the effectiveness and
scalability of the proposed mechanisms that bring several orders of magnitude improvements over
the state of the art. This paper extends an early work presented in [15].
Paper Organization The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and
describes the group size release problem. Section 3 reviews the privacy notion adopted in this
work, as well as some useful results adopted in the privacy analysis of the proposed mechanisms.
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user unit region quantity
01 A GA 1
02 B GA 1
03 A GA 1
04 A GA 1
05 C GA 1
06 D NY 1
07 E NY 1
08 D NY 1
09 D NY 1
10 F NY 1
11 F NY 1
Table 2: Example dataset describing the user
identifier pi P P , its unit ui P U , the user’s
region ri P R and the unit quantity zi P Z
pi P r11sq.
region u group Gu σu
GA
A t01, 03, 04u 3
B t02u 1
C t05u 1
NY
D t06, 08, 09u 3
E t07u 1
F t10, 11u 2
Table 3: Groups pGuq and sum of unit quantities
(σu) for the users u P U of Table 2.
Section 4 presents the Privacy-Preserving Group Size Release (PGSR) problem and discusses its
privacy, consistency, validity, and faithfulness criteria. Section 5 presentsMH , a two-step mechanism
for the PGSR problem that uses an optimization-based post-processing step to satisfy the PGSR
criteria. Section 6 presentsMdpH , an exact mechanism for the PGSR problem that exploits dynamic
programming. While the proposed mechanism is exact, it becomes ineffective for very large real-life
applications. An efficient polynomial-time solution for solving the dynamic program is presented in
Section 7. Section 8 discusses how to use cumulative queries to reduce the amount of noise required
to produce the privacy-preserving counts and Section 9 presentsMc, a sub-optimal algorithm to
solve the PGSR under cumulative queries. Then, Section 9.1 and Section 9.2 present, respectively, an
approximate and exact efficient dynamic-programming mechanism for solving the PGSR problem
under cumulative queries. Finally, Section 10 discusses related work, Section 11 report an evaluation
of the proposed mechanisms on several realistic datasets, and Section 12 concludes the work.
A summary of the important symbols adopted in the paper is provided in Table 1. The appendix
contains the proofs for all lemmas and theorems.
2 Problem Specification
This paper is motivated by applications from the US Census Bureau, whose goal is to release socio-
demographic features of the population grouped by census blocks, counties, and states. For instance,
the bureau is interested in releasing information such as the number of people in a household and
how many cars they own. This section provides a generic formalization of this release problem.
Consider a dataset D “ tppi, ui, ri, ziquni“1 containing n tuples ppi, ui, ri, ziq P P ˆ U ˆR ˆ Z
denoting, respectively, a (randomly generated) identifier for user i P rns, its unit identifier (e.g.,
the home address where she lives), the region in which she lives, (e.g., a census block), and a unit
quantity describing a socio-demographic feature, e.g., the number of cars she owns, or her salary
bracket. The set of users sharing the same unit forms a group and Gu “ tpi P P | ui “ uu denotes
the group of unit u. The socio-demographic feature of interest is the sum of the unit quantities of a
group Gu, i.e., σu “ řpiPGu zi.
Example1 Consider the example dataset of Table 2. It shows 11 users (pi P P , their addresses
(unit identifiers ui P U) , the US states in which they live (regions ri P U), and the associated 0/1
quantity denoting a feature of interest (zi P Zq. In the running example, the feature of interest is
always 1, since the application is interested with the composition of the household, i.e., how many
people live at the same address. Hence the groups identify households and the sums of unit quantities
represent household sizes. The set of users, units, and regions, are, respectively: P “ t01, . . . , 11u,
U “ tA,B,C,D,E, F u, and R “ tGA,NY,USu. The table shows that some users live in the
same address (e.g., user 01, 03, and 04 all live in address A), identifying the users of group GA, as
illustrated in Table 3. In addition to the groups Gu, for all unit u P U , Table 3 also reports the sum
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GA NY
USLev 1
Lev 2
Figure 1: A region hierarchy associated to
the example of Table 2.
group sizes Lev 2 Lev 1
GA NY US
1 2 1 3
2 0 1 1
3 1 1 2
4 0 0 0
5 “ |S| “ N 0 0 0
nGA nNY nUS
Table 4: The hierarchical group-size quanti-
ties associated to the example dataset of Ta-
ble 2.
of unit quantities σu associated with each group Gu. In the example, these quantities denote the
household sizes. For instance, σA “ 3 denotes that 3 users live in unit A (e.g., in group GA).
In addition to the dataset, the census bureau works with a region hierarchy that is formalized by a
tree T of L levels. Each level ` P rLs is associated with a set of regionsR` Ď R, forming a partition
on D. Region r1 is a subregion of region r, which is denoted by r1 ă r, if r1 is contained in r and
levpr1q “ levprq ` 1, where levprq denotes the level of r. The root level contains a single region rJ.
The children of r, i.e., chprq “ tr1 P R|r1 ă ru is the set of regions that partitions r in the next level
of the hierarchy and paprq denotes the parent of region r (r ‰ rJ). Figure 1 provides an illustration
of a hierarchy of 2 levels. Each node represents a region. The regions GA and NY form a partition
of region US.
The set S of all unit sizes, (tσu | u P Uu Ď S), also plays an important role. Indeed, the bureau is
interested in releasing, for every unit size σ P S , the quantity nσ “ |tGu | u P U , σu “ σu|, i.e., the
number of groups of size σ. The number of groups with size σ P S and region r P R is denoted
by nrσ “ |tu P U | σu “ σ ^ u P ru| and nr “ pnr1, . . . , nrN q denotes the vector of group sizes for
region r, where N “ |S|.
Example2 In the running example, Figure 1 illustrates a region hierarchy, depicting US as the root
region, at level 1 of the hierarchy. Its children chpUSq “ tGA,NYu represent the states of Georgia
and New York, at level 2 of the hierarchy. Table 4 illustrates the group size table that, for each group
size s P rN “ 5s, counts the number of groups that are households of size s. For instance, in region
GA, there two groups u whose size σu “ 1: They are groups A and B; in region NY, is a single
group whose size is equal 1: E; Finally, in region US there three groups whose size σu “ 1: A, B,
and E (represented in the first row of the table). The group vectors, for each region, are, respectively:
nGA “ p2, 0, 1, 0, 0q, nNY “ p1, 1, 1, 0, 0q, and nUS “ p3, 1, 2, 0, 0q.
It is now possible to define the problem of interest to the bureau: The goal is to release, for every
group size s P rN s and region r P R, the numbers nrs of groups of size s in region r, while preserving
individual privacy. The region hierarchy and the group sizes S are considered public non-sensitive
information. The entries associating users with groups (see Table 2) are sensitive information.
Therefore, the paper focuses on protecting the privacy of such information. For simplicity, this paper
assumes that the region hierarchy has exactly L levels. The paper also focuses on the vastly common
case when zi P t0, 1u pi P rnsq, but the results generalize to arbitrary zi values.
3 Differential Privacy
This paper adopts the framework of differential privacy [10, 11], which is the de-facto standard for
privacy protection.
Definition1 (Differential Privacy [10]) A randomized algorithmM : D Ñ R is -differentially
private if
PrrMpD1q P Os ď exppqPrrMpD2q P Os, (1)
for any output response O Ď R and any two datasets D1, D2 P D differing in at most one individual
(called neighbors and written D1 „ D2).
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Parameter  ą 0 is the privacy loss of the algorithm, with values close to 0 denoting strong privacy.
Intuitively, the definition states that the probability of any event does not change much when a single
individual data is added or removed to the dataset, limiting the amount of information that the output
reveals about any individual.
This paper relies on the global sensitivity method [10]. The global sensitivity ∆q of a function
q : D Ñ Rk (also called query) is defined as the maximum amount by which q changes when a
single individual is added to, or removed from, a dataset:
∆q “ max
D1„D2
}qpD1q ´ qpD2q}1. (2)
Queries in this paper concern the group size vectors nr and neighboring datasets differ by the
presence or absence of at most one record (see Tables 2 and 4).
The global sensitivity is used to calibrate the amount of noise to add to the query output to achieve
differential privacy. There are several sensitivity-based mechanisms [10, 25] and this paper uses the
Geometric mechanism [16] for integral queries. It relies on a double-geometric distribution and has
slightly less variance than the ubiquitous Laplace mechanism [10].
Definition2 (Geometric Mechanism [16]) Given a dataset D, a query q : D Ñ Rk, and  ą 0,
the geometric mechanism adds independent noise to each dimension of the query output qpDq using
the distribution
P pX“vq“ 1´ e
´
1` e´ e
´
´ |v|∆q
¯
.
This distribution is also referred to as double-geometric with scale ∆q{. In the following, Geompλqk
denotes the i.i.d. double-geometric distribution over k dimensions with parameter λ. The geometric
mechanism satisfies -differential privacy [16]. Differential privacy also satisfies several important
properties [11].
Lemma1 (Sequential Composition) The composition of two -differentially private mechanisms
(M1,M2) satisfies 2-differential privacy.
Lemma2 (Parallel Composition) Let D1 and D2 be disjoint subsets of D and M be an -
differential private algorithm. Computing MpD X D1q and MpD X D2q satisfies -differential
privacy.
Lemma3 (Post-Processing Immunity) LetM be an -differential private algorithm and g be an
arbitrary mapping from the set of possible output sequences O to an arbitrary set. Then, g ˝M is
-differential private.
4 The Privacy-Preserving Group Size Release Problem
This section formalizes the Privacy-preserving Group Size Release (PGSR) problem [20]. Consider a
dataset D, a region hierarchy T for D, where each node ar in T is associated with a vector nr P ZN`
describing the group sizes for region r P R, and let G “ řsPrNs nJs be the total number of individual
groups in D, which is public information (see Figure 2 for an example). The PGSR problem consists
in releasing a hierarchy of group sizes T˜ “ xn˜r | r P Ry1 that satisfies the following conditions:
1. Privacy: T˜ is -differentially private.
2. Consistency: For each region r P R and group size s P S , the group sizes in the subregions
r1 of r add up to those in region r:
n˜rs “
ÿ
r1Pchprq
n˜r
1
s .
3. Validity: The values n˜rs are non-negative integers.
1We abuse notation and use the angular parenthesis to denote a hierarchy.
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3 1 2 0 0
Group Sizes
1   2   3   4   5
1 1 1 0 02 0 1 0 0
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5
Levels
1
L=2
N=5
G=6
nUS
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Figure 2: Group size hierarchy T2 associated with the dataset of Table 2.
4. Faithfulness: The group sizes at each level ` of the hierarchy add up to the value G:ÿ
rPR`
ÿ
sPrNs
n˜rs “ G.
These constraints ensure that the hierarchical group size estimates satisfy all publicly known properties
of the original data.
5 The Direct Optimization-Based PGSR Mechanism
This section presents a two-step mechanism for the PGSR problem, first introduced in [20]. The first
step produces a noisy version of the group sizes, whereas the second step restores the feasibility of
the PGSR constraints while staying as close as possible to the noisy counts. The first step produces a
noisy hierarchy T˜ “ tn˜r | r P Ru using the geometric mechanism with parameter λ “ 2L on the
vectors nr:
n˜r “ nr ` Geom
´2L

¯N
. (3)
The following lemma and theorem, whose proofs are in the appendix, show that this step satisfies
-differential privacy.
Lemma4 The sensitivity ∆n of the group estimate query is 2.
Theorem1 MH satisfies -differential privacy.
Proofs for all Theorems and Lemmas are reported in the appendix.
The output of the first step satisfies Condition 1 of the PGSR problem but it will violate (with high
probability) the other conditions. To restore feasibility, this paper uses a post-processing strategy
similar to the one proposed in [13] for mobility applications and in [20]. After generating T˜ using
Equation (3), the mechanism post-processes the values n˜r of T˜ through the Quadratic Integer
Program (QIP) depicted in Model 1. Its goal is to find a new region hierarchy Tˆ , optimizing over
the variables nˆr “ pnˆr1 . . . nˆrN q for each r PR, so that their values stay close to the noisy counts
of the first step, while satisfying faithfulness (Constraint (H2)), consistency (Constraint (H3)), and
validity (Constraint (H4)). In the optimization model, Drs represents the domain (of integer, non-
negative values) of nˆrs. The resulting mechanism is called the Hierarchical PGSR and denoted byMH . It satisfies -differential privacy because of post-processing immunity (Lemma 3), since the
post-processing step ofMH uses exclusively differentially private information (T˜ ).
Solving this QIP is intractable for the datasets of interest to the census bureau. Therefore, the
experimental results consider a version ofMH that relaxes the integrability constraint (H4) and
rounds the solutions. However, the resulting optimization problem becomes convex but presents
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Model 1 TheMH post-processing step
Minimize
tnˆrurPR
ÿ
rPR
|nˆr ´ n˜r|22 (H1)
Subject to:
ÿ
sPrNs
nˆrs “ G @r P R (H2)ÿ
cPchprq
nˆcs “ nˆrs @r P R, s P rN s (H3)
nˆrs P Drs @r P R, s P rN s (H4)
two limitations: (i) its final solution Tˆ may violate the PGSR consistency (2) and faithfulness (4)
conditions, and (ii) the mechanism is still too slow for very large problems.
6 The Dynamic Programming PGSR Mechanism
To overcome theMH limitations discussed above, this section proposes a dynamic-programming
approach for the post-processing step and its convex relaxation. The resulting mechanism is called
the Dynamic Programming PGSR mechanism and denoted byMdpH . The dynamic program relies
on a new hierarchy T dp that modifies the original region hierarchy T as follows. It creates as many
subtrees as the number N of group sizes S . In each of these subtrees, node ars is associated with the
number nrs of groups of size s in region r. Its children tacsucPchprq are associated with the numbers
ncs, and so on. Thus, the nodes of subtree s represent the groups of size s for all the regions in R.
Finally, the new hierarchy has a root note aJ that represents the total number G of groups: It is
associated with a dummy region J whose children are the root nodes of the N subtrees introduced
above. The resulting region hierarchy is denoted T dp.
Example3 The region hierarchy T dp associated with the running example is shown in Figure 3. The
root node aJ is associated with the total number of groups inD, i.e.,G “ 6. Its children aUS1 , . . . , aUS5
represent the group sizes for the root of the region hierarchy for each group size s P rN “ 5s. Subtree
1, rooted at aUS1 , has two children: a
GA
1 and a
NY
1 , representing the number of groups of size 1: n
GA
1
and nNY1 . The figure illustrates the association of each node a
r
s with its real group size n
r
s (in red)
and its noisy group size generated by the geometrical mechanism (in blue and parenthesis).
Note that (i) the value of a node equals to the sum of the values of its children, (ii) the group sizes at
a given level add up to G, and (iii) the PGSR consistency conditions of the nodes in a subtree are
independent of those of other subtrees. These observations allow us to develop a dynamic program
that guarantees the PGSR conditions and exploits the independence of each subtree associated with
groups of size s to solve the post-processing problem efficiently.
For notational simplicity, the presentation omits the subscripts denoting the group size s and focuses
on the computation of a single subtree representing a group of size s. The dynamic program associates
a cost table τ r with each node ar of T dp. The cost table represents a function τ r : Dr Ñ R` that
maps values (i.e., group sizes) to costs, where Dr is the domain (a set of natural numbers) of region
r. Intuitively, τ rpvq is the optimal cost for the post-processed group sizes in the subtree rooted at ar
when its post-processed group size is equal to v, i.e., nˆr “ v. The key insight of the dynamic program
is the observation that the optimal cost for τ rpvq can be computed from the cost tables τ c of each of
its children c P chprq using the following:
τ rpvq “
´
v ´ n˜r
¯2` (4a)
φrpvq “ Minimize
txcucPchprq
ÿ
cPchprq
τ cpxcq (4b)
Subject to:
ÿ
cPchprq
xc “ v (4c)
xc P Dc @c P chprq. (4d)
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Figure 3: Region hierarchy T dp associated with the dataset of Table 2.
In the above, (4a) describes the cost for v of deviating from the noisy group size n˜r. The function
φrpvq, defined in (4b), (4c), and (4d), uses the cost table of the children of r to find the combination
of post-processed group sizes txc P DcucPchprq of r’s children that is consistent (4c) and minimizes
the sum of their costs (4b).
v τGA1 τ
NY
1 τ
US
1
0 9 ‹0 4` minp9`0q
1 4 1 1` minp9`1, 4`0q
2 1 4 0` minp0`4, 4`1, 1`0q
3 ‹0 9 ‹1` minp0`0, 1`1, 4`4, 9`9q
4 1 16 4` minp1`0, 0`1, 1`4, . . .q
Table 5: Example of cost table computation for
subtree associated to the group 1 estimates.
The dynamic program exploits these concepts
in two phases. The first phase is bottom-up and
computes the cost tables for each node, starting
from the leaves only, which are defined by (4a),
and moving up, level by level, to the root. The
cost table at the root is then used to retrieve
the optimal cost of the problem. The second
phase is top-down: Starting from the root, each
node ar receives its post-processed group size
nˆr and solves φrpnˆrq to retrieve the optimal
post-processed group sizes nˆc “ xc for each child c P chprq.
An illustration of the process for the running example is illustrated in Table 5. It depicts the cost
tables τGA1 , τ
NY
1 , and τ
US
1 related to the subtree rooted at a
US
1 (groups of size 1) computed during the
bottom-up phase. The values selected during the top-down phase are highlighted with a star symbol.
In the implementation, the values φrpvq are computed using a constraint program where (4a) uses
a table constraint. The number of optimization problems in the dynamic program is given by the
following theorem.
Theorem2 Constructing Tˆ dp requires solving Op|R|ND¯) optimization problems given in Equa-
tion (4), where D¯ “ maxs,r |Drs | for r P R, s P rN s.
7 A Polynomial-Time PGSR Mechanism
The dynamic program relies on solving an optimization problem for each region. This section shows
that this optimization problem can be solved in polynomial time by exploiting the structure of the
cost tables.
A cost table is a finite set of pairs (s, c) where s is a group size and c is a cost. When the pairs are
ordered by increasing values of s and line segments are used to connect them as in Figure 4, the
resulting function is Piecewise Linear (PWL). For simplicity, we say that a cost table is PLW if its
underlying function is PWL. Observe also that, at a leaf, the cost table is Convex PWL (CPWL),
since the L2-Norm is convex (see Equation (4a)).
The key insight behind the polynomial-time mechanism is the recognition that the function φr is
CPWL whenever the cost tables of its children are CPWL. As a result, by induction, the cost table of
every node ar is CPWL.
8
0 1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 ⌧NY1
Figure 4: Cost tables, extending Figure 3, computed by the mechanism.
Lemma5 The cost table τ rs of each node ars of T dp is CPWL.
Lemma 5 makes it possible to design a polynomial-time algorithm to replace the constraint program
used in the dynamic program. The next paragraphs give the intuition underlying the algorithm.
Given a node ar, the first step of the algorithm is to select, for each node c P chprq, the value v0c
with minimum cost, i.e., v0c “ argminv τ cpvq. As a result, the value V 0 “
ř
c v
0
c has minimal
cost φrpV 0q “ řc τ cpv0c q. Having constructed the minimum value in cost table φr, it remains to
compute the costs of all values V 0`k for all integer k P r1,maxDr´V 0s and all values V 0´k for
all integer k P r1, V 0 ´minDrs. The presentation focuses on the values V 0 ` k since the two cases
are similar. Let v0 “ tv0cucPchprq. The algorithm builds a sequence of vectors v1,v2, . . . ,vk, . . .
that provides the optimal combinations of values for φrpV 0 ` 1q,φrpV 0 ` 2q, . . . ,φrpV 0 ` kq, . . ..
Vector vk is obtained from vk´1 by changing the value of a single child whose cost table has the
smallest slope, i.e.,
vkc “
"
vk´1c ` 1 if c “ argminc τ cpvk´1c ` 1q ´ τ cpvk´1c q
vk´1c otherwise.
(5)
Once φr has been computed, cost table τ r can be computed easily since both pv ´ n˜rq2 and φr
are CPWL and the sum of two CPWL functions is CPWL. A full algorithm is described in the next
section.
Example4 These concepts are illustrated in Figure 4, where the values of φr are highlighted in
blue, and in parenthesis, in the right table. The first step identifies that v0NY “ 0, v0GA “ 3, thus
V 0 “ 3 and φrp3q “ τNYp0q`τGAp3q “ 0`0 “ 0. In the example, v0 “ pv0NY, v0GAq “ p0, 3q and
v1 “ pv1NY, v1GAq “ p1, 3q, since NY “ argmintτNYp0 ` 1q ´ τNYp0q, τGAp3 ` 1q ´ τGAp3qu “
argmint1 ´ 0, 1 ´ 0u. Its associated cost, φUSpv1q “ 1 ` 0 “ 1. v2 “ p1, 4q since GA “
argmintpτNYp1 ` 1q ´ τNYp1qq, pτGAp3 ` 1q ´ τGAp3qqu “ argmintp4 ´ 1q, p1 ´ 0qu, and its
associated cost φUSpv2q “ 1` 1 “ 2.
Theorem3 The cost table τ rs of each node ars of T dp is CPWL.
7.1 Computing Cost Tables Efficiently
The procedure to compute φrs is depicted in Algorithm 1: It is executed during the bottom-up phase
of the dynamic program in lieu of Equations (4a) to (4d). It takes as input the node ar and returns its
associated cost function τ r. Let Dc` “ tv | v P Dc ^ v ą argminv1 τ cpv1qu be the set of elements
in the domain of τ c whose values are greater than the value corresponding to the table minimum cost.
Similarly, let Dc´ “ tv | v P Dc ^ v ă argminv1 τ cpv1qu. Lines 1 and 2 construct the vectors v`
and v´ that list the pairs pc, τ cpvq ´ τ cpv ´ 1qq of node identifier and slope associated with the cost
function for every child node ac of ar and element v P Dc` (resp. P Dc´), sorted using the second
element of the pair. Lines 3 and 4 extract the identifiers for each element of the sorted lists v` and
v´ and call the function Merge to update the node cost function τ r.
The heart of Algorithm 1 is the function Merge. For a node τ r, it takes as input a sorted vector
of the identifiers (containing as many elements as the sum of all children’s domain sizes), a value
κPt`1,´1u, and the current node τ r. Line 6 constructs a map v that assigns to each children ac of
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Algorithm 1: TableMerge(ar)
1 v`Ðsort2pxc, τ cpvq ´ τ cpv ´ 1qy | cPchprq, vPDc`q
2 v´Ðsort2pxc, τ cpvq ´ τ cpv ´ 1qy | cPchprq, vPDc´q
3 τ r Ð Mergepextract1pv`q,`1, τ rq
4 τ r Ð Mergepextract1pv´q,´1, τ rq
5 Function Merge(v, κ, τ r):
6 vrcs Ð argmin τ c @c P chpcq
7 v Ð řcPchprq vrcs
8 if κ ą 0^ v P Dr then τ rpvq Ð řcPchpcq τ cpvrcsq
9 for e P v do
10 vres Ð vres ` κ
11 v Ð řcPchprq vrcs
12 if v P Dr then τ rpvq Ð řcPchprq τ cpvrcsq
13 end
14 return τ r
ar the value associated with the minimum cost of its table τ r. Line 7 sums the values in the map v
resulting in a value v for which the function will compute the cost τ r of the parent node (line 8). The
conditional statement ensures that this operation is done only once–the Merge function is also called
on vector v´. Next, for each element in the sorted vector v, the function selects the next element e, it
increases its current index vres by κ, and repeats the operations above, effectively computing the
value τ rpvq for the cost table of node ar. Line 12 simply ensures that the computed value is in the
domain of the node.
Example5 An example of the effect of Algorithm 1 executed on a few steps of the cost ta-
bles τUS1 , τ
GA
1 , τ
NY
1 is illustrated in Figure 4. Consider the computation of the cost function
τUS1 . We focus only on the first call of the Merge function. The algorithm first constructs the
vector v` “ ppNY, 1q, pGA, 4q, pNY, 2q, pGA, 5q, pNY, 3qq (line 1), extracts its first component
v` “ pNY,GA,NY,GA,NYq (line 3), and hence calls the Merge function. The routine first ini-
tializes the vector v as vrNYs “ argmin τNY1 “ 0,vrGAs “ argmin τGA1 “ 3 (line 6), and
v “ vrNYs`vrGAs “ 0`3 “ 3 (line 7). It hence computes the value τUS1 p3q “ 1 (line 8). Its asso-
ciated cost is composed by the parent contribution (from Equation (4a)) |3´ 2|2 “ 1 and the children
contribution τNY1 p0q “ 0 and τGA1 p3q “ 0. Next, the algorithm increases v by 1 (v “ 4), in line 11,
and selects the next element in v` (i.e., "NY"), in line 9. It increments its value, vrNYs “ 1 (line 10),
and computes: τUS1 p4q “ |4´ 2|2`τNY1 pvrNYsq`τGA1 pvrGAsq “ 4` 1` 0 “ 5 (line 12). Finally,
it increases v by 1 (v “ 5) and selects the next element in v` (i.e., “GA"). It increments its value,
vrGAs “ 1 and computes: τUS1 p5q “ |5´ 2|2 ` τNY1 pvrNYsq ` τGA1 pvrGAsq “ 9` 1` 1 “ 11.
Theorem4 The cost table τ rs for each region r and size s can be computed in time O
`
D¯ log D¯
˘
.
The result above can be derived observing that the runtime complexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated
by the sorting operations in lines 1 and 2.
8 Cumulative Counts for Reduced Sensitivity
In the mechanisms presented so far, each query has sensitivity ∆n “ 2. This section exploits the
structure of the group query to reduce the query sensitivity and thus the noise introduced by the
geometric mechanism. The idea relies on an operator ‘ : ZN` Ñ ZN` that, given a vector n “
pn1, . . . , nN q of group sizes, returns its cumulative version c “ pc1, . . . , cN q where cs “ řsk“1 nk
is the cumulative sum of the first s elements of n.
Lemma6 The sensitivity ∆c of the cumulative group estimate query is 1.
The result follows from the fact that removing an element from a group s in c only decreases group s
by one and increases the group s´ 1 preceding it by one. This idea is from [18], where cumulative
sizes are referred to as unattributed histograms.
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Figure 5: Cumulative group size hierarchy T c2 associated with the dataset of Table 2.
Model 2 TheMc post-processing step.
Minimize
tcˆrurPR
ÿ
rPR
}cˆr ´ c˜r}22 (C1)
Subject to: cˆJN “ G (C2)
cˆri ď cˆri`1 @r P R, i P rN ´ 1s (C3)ÿ
r1Pchprq
cˆr
1
i “ cˆri @r P R, i P rN s (C4)
cˆri P t0, 1, . . .u @r P R, i P rN s (C5)
9 Cumulative PGSR Mechanisms
Operator ‘ can be used to produce a hierarchy T c “ tcr|r P Ru of cumulative group sizes. An
example of such a hierarchy is provided in Figure 5. To generate a privacy-preserving version T˜ c
of T c, it suffices to apply the geometrical mechanism with parameter λ “ pL{qN on the vectors
cr associated with every node ars for the groups of size s in region r of the region hierarchy. Once
the noisy sizes are computed, the noisy group sizes can be easily retrieved via an inverse mapping
a : ZN` Ñ ZN` from the cumulative sums.
Note, however, that the resulting private versions c˜r of cr may no longer be non-decreasing (or
even non-negative) due to the added noise. Therefore, as in Section 5, a post-processing step is
applied to restore consistency and to guarantee the PGSR conditions (2) to (4). The post-processing
is illustrated in Model 2. It takes as input the noisy hierarchy of cumulative sizes T˜ c computed with
the geometrical mechanism and optimizes over variables cˆr “ pcˆr1, . . . , cˆrN q for r P R, minimizing
the L2-norm with respect to their noisy counterparts (Equation (C1)). Constraints (C2) guarantees
that the sum of the sizes equals the public value G (PGSR condition 4), where J denotes the root
region of the region hierarchy. Constraints (C3) guarantee consistency of the cumulative counts.
Finally, Constraints (C4) and (C5), respectively, guarantee the PGSR consistency (2) and validity (3)
conditions.
Once the post-processed hierarchy Tˆ c is obtained, the operatora is applied to obtain a post-processed
version of the group size hierarchy Tˆ . The resulting mechanism, denoted by Mc is called the
Cumulative PGSR Mechanism.Mc satisfies -differential privacy, due to post-processing immunity,
similarly to the argument presented in Theorem 1 (see Appendix). This mechanism is called the
cumulative PGSR and denoted byMc.
9.1 An Approximate Dynamic Programing Cumulative PGSR Mechanisms
Unlike forMH , the structure of the PGSR problem cannot be exploited directly to create a dynamic-
programming mechanism. The constraints imposed by the optimization in Model 2 do not allow for a
hierarchical decomposition with recurrent substructure as the inequalities (C3) relate sibling nodes in
the hierarchy. Therefore, a dynamic program that exploits the dependencies induced by the region
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Algorithm 2:Mdpc .post-process
input : T˜ c “ tc˜r | r P Ru
1 foreach r P R do
2 cˆr Ð argmin
cˆ
}cˆ´ c˜r}2
Subject to: cˆi ď cˆi`1 @i P rN ´ 1s
0 ď cˆi ď G @i P rN s
3 n¯Ð aproundpcˆrqq
4 Tˆ Ð T¯ Y tn¯u
5 end
6 Tˆ ÐMdp.post-processpTˆ q
hierarchy T , would need to associate each node ar in T with a cost table τ r which may take as input
vectors of size up to N . It follows that each cost table τ r size is in Op`G`N´1N´1 ˘q, which makes this
dynamic-programming approach computationally intractable, especially for real-world applications.
To address this issue, a previous version of this work [15], proposed an approximated dynamic
program version of the cumulative mechanism, calledMdpc that operates in three steps:
1. It creates a noisy hierarchy T˜ c.
2. Next, it executes the post-processing step described in Algorithm 2.
3. Finally, it runs the post-processing step of the polynomial-time PGSR mechanism (see
Section 7).
The important addition is in step 2 which takes T˜ c as input and, for each node c˜r, solves the
convex program described in line 2 of Algorithm 2 to create a new noisy hierarchy cˆr that is non-
decreasing and non-negative. The resulting cumulative vector cˆr is then rounded and transformed to
its corresponding group size vector through operatorap¨q (line 3). The resulting vector n¯r is added to
the region hierarchy Tˆ (line 4). Observe that this post-processing step pays a polynomial-time penalty
with respect to the runtime of theMdpH post-processing. The convex program of line (2) is executed in
OppolypNqq and the resulting post-processing step runtime is in O`|R|polypNq ` |R|ND¯ log D¯˘.
While, the experimental results (see Section 11) show thatMdpc consistently reduces the final error,
when compared toMdpH , it is important to note thatMdpc does not solve the same post-processing
program as the cumulative PGSR mechanism specified by Equations (C1) to (C2), since it restores
consistency of the cumulative counts locally. To address this issue, this work introduces next an exact
DP cumulative PGSR mechanism.
9.2 An Exact Dynamic Programming Cumulative PGSR Mechanisms
This section develops an exact and efficient dynamic programming algorithm for solving the cumu-
lative PGSR problem optimally. It relies on the observation that, when the cumulative operator ‘
is applied to the hierarchy T dp instead than to the original hierarchy T , the post-processing step of
Model 2 only imposes inequalities among sibling nodes within each subtree, allowing the construction
of overlapping sub-problems.
More precisely, the key insight is to build a chain of nodes by visiting the tree hierarchy T dp (see
Figure 3) using a post-order traversal. The resulting chain structure T ch is composed of |R|N
nodes, where ai refers to the i-th node in the post-order traversal of T dp. This chain structure
enables the use of an efficient dynamic-programming algorithm to solve the post-processing step
over cumulative counts. The resulting mechanism is referred to as the Chain-based Cumulative
Dynamic Programming PGSR mechanism and denoted byMchc . It operates in three phases described
as follows.
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Figure 6: The T ch node ordering associated with the dataset of Table 2.
Model 3 The modified post-processing step.
Let 9N “ |R|N
Minimize
tcˆiuiPr 9Ns
9Nÿ
i“1
}cˆi ´ c˜i}22 (C6)
Subject to: cˆ 9N “ G (C7)
cˆi ď cˆi`1 @i P
!
i P r 9N ´ 1s | levpaiq “ levpai`1q
)
(C8)
cˆi “ cˆi`1 @i P
!
i P r 9N ´ 1s | levpaiq ą levpai`1q
)
(C9)
cˆi P t0, 1, . . .u @i P r 9N s (C10)
9.2.1 Cumulative Hierarchy Pre-processing Phase
Given a DP hierarchy T dp, the algorithm constructs a chain T ch “ tci | i P r|R|N su by traversing
the nodes of T dp using a post-ordering scheme. Denote with ai and ni the i-th node and group size
value, respectively, in the post-order traversal of T dp. The cumulative count ci associated with node
ai is the sum of ni and all values nj associated with nodes aj that precedes ai and lie in the same
level as ai in T dp. More formally,
ci “
ÿ
jPSi
nj , Si “ tj | j ď i, levpajq “ levpaiqu ,
where levpaq describes the level of node a in T dp. An illustration of the chain structure T ch associated
with the running example is shown in Figure 6.
9.2.2 Privacy Phase
Next, the algorithm constructs a noisy version of the T ch hierarchy, denoted T˜ ch that is constructed
by applying the geometrical mechanism with parameter λpL{q|R`|N to the cumulative count vector
c` associated with the nodes at level ` for all ` P rLs. Figure 6 illustrates the resulting cumulative
group values after the privacy-preserving phase in blue.
9.2.3 The Post-processing Phase
Given a noisy version c˜` of the cumulative group sizes, an application of the inverse mapping a on
c˜` for each level ` P rLs is sufficient to retrieve the desired noisy group sizes. However, the resulting
group sizes may not satisfy the PGSR validity and consistency conditions. The third phase ofMc is
a post-processing step to restore the PGSR conditions 2 to 4.
This step is illustrated in Model 3. It aims at generating a new chain Tˆ ch whose counts are close
to their noisy counterparts (C6) and satisfy the faithfulness (C7), consistency (C8) and (C9), and
validity conditions (C10). Once the post-processed chain Tˆ ch is obtained, the operator a is applied
to obtain the corresponding version of the group size hierarchy Tˆ .
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The advantage of this formulation is its ability to exploit the chain structure T ch associated with the
region hierarchy T dpc , via an efficient dynamic programming algorithm to solve the post-processing
step. Similarly toMdpH , this dynamic program consists of two phases, a bottom-up and a top-down
phase, corresponding to the direction in which the chain is traversed.
In the bottom-up phase, each node ai of T ch constructs a cost table τi : Di Ñ R`, where Di Ď N
is the domain associated with node ai, mapping values to costs. Intuitively, the cost table τipvq
represents the optimal cost for the first i nodes when the post-processed cumulative group size of the
node ai is equal to v. The cost tables for all nodes are updated starting from the head of the chain to
its tail, according to the following recurrence relationship:
τi`1pvq “ pv ´ c˜i`1q2 ` (6a)
φi`1pvq “
$&%τipvq if levpaiq ą levpai`1q,MinimizexiPDi
xiďv
τipxiq otherwise. (6b)
The formulation for the cost τi`1pvq has two components. The first component captures the deviation
of the post-processed value v from the noisy cumulative group size c˜i`1 (Equation (6a)). The second
component captures the optimal post-processing cost associated with the first i nodes of the chain,
provided that the succeeding node ai`1 takes on value of v (Equation (6b)).
In the top-down phase, the algorithm traverses each node from the tail of the chain to its head.
The node cˆ|R|N is set to value G (to satisfy Constraint (C7)). Each visited node ai`1, for any
i P r|R|N ´ 1s, receives the post-processed cumulative group size cˆi`1 and determines the optimal
post-processed solution for its predecessor ai by solving φi`1pcˆi`1q given in (6b).
Example6 An example of the mechanism Mchc executed on a few steps of the
cost tables τGA1 , τ
NY
1 , τ
US
1 is shown in Table 6. Consider the computation of the
v τGA1 τ
NY
1
0 9 9`9“minp9q
1 4 4`4“minp9, 4q
2 1 1`1“minp0, 4, 1q
3 ˚0 ˚0`0“minp9, 4, 1, 0q
4 1 1`0“minp9, 4, 1, 0, 1q
v τNY1 τ
US
1
0 18 4`18
1 8 1`8
2 2 0`2
3 ˚0 ˚1`0
4 1 4`1
Table 6: Example of cost table computation for
subtree associated to the group 1 estimates.
cost function τUS1 in the bottom-up phase. To
start with, the algorithm initializes the cost ta-
ble τGA1 as τ
GA
1 pvq “ |v ´ 3|2, where the noisy
cumulative group size associated with the node
aGA1 is 3. Notice that the post-processed cumu-
lative group size of this node aGA1 is not sup-
posed to exceed that of its succeeding node aNY1 .
Thus, the algorithm updates the cost table τNY1
by aggregating the following two parts: The one
including the cost associated with the current
node |v ´ 3|2 and the that including the optimal
cost for its preceding node(s) min0ďxďv τGA1 pxq. It follows that τNY1 p3q “ |3´ 3|2 `
min0ďxď3 τGA1 pxq “ 0`τGA1 p3q “ 0`0 “ 0. Then, for the node aUS1 , its post-processed cumulative
group size equals that of its preceding node aNY1 . As a result, its associated cost, say τ
US
1 p3q, is
composed by |3´ 2|2 “ 1 and τNY1 p3q “ 0. The table marks the value selected during the top-down
phase with a ˚ symbol.
The next results discuss the piecewise linear convexity of the cost function φ and the computational
complexity of the algorithm.
Lemma7 The cost table τi of each node ai of T ch is CPWL.
Theorem5 The cost table τi for each i P r|R|N s can be computed in time O
`
D¯
˘
, where D¯ “
maxi |Di| for i P r|R|N s.
10 Related Work
The release of privacy-preserving datasets using differential privacy has been subject of extensive
research [19, 24, 22]. These methods focus on creating unattributed histograms that count the number
of individuals associated with each possible property in the dataset universe. During the years, more
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sophisticated algorithms have been proposed, including those exploiting the problem structure using
optimization to improve accuracy [7, 22, 26, 23].
Additional extensions to consider hierarchical problems were also explored. Hay et al. [18] and
Qardaji et al. [26] study methods to answer count queries over ranges using a hierarchical structure to
impose consistency of counts. While hierarchies contribute an additional level of fidelity for realizing
a realistic data release it further challenge the privacy/accuracy tradeoff. Other methods have also
incorporated partitioning scheme to the data-release problem to further increase the accuracy of
the privacy-preserving data by cleverly splitting the privacy budget in different hierarchical levels
[31, 8, 32].
These methods differ in two ways from the mechanisms proposed here: (1) They focus on histograms
queries, rather than group queries; the latter generally have higher L1-sensitivity and thus require
more noise and (2) they ensure neither the consistency for integral counts nor the non-negativity of
the release counts. They thus violate the requirements of group sizes (see Section 4).
Fioretto and Van Hentenryck recently proposed a hierarchical-based solution based on minimizing
the L2-distance between the noisy counts and their private counterparts [13]. While this solution
guarantees non-negativity of the counts, their mechanism, if formulated as a MIP/QIP, cannot cope
with the scale of the census problems discussed here which compute privacy-preserving country-wise
group sizes. If their solution is used as is, in its relaxed form, then it cannot guarantee the integrality
of the counts. These mechanisms reduce toMrH , which, has is shown to be strongly dominated by
the DP-based mechanisms (see Section 11).
A line of work that is closely related to the problem analyzed in this paper is that initiated by Blocki
et al. [6] and Hay et al. [18] that study unattributed histogram which are often used to study node
degrees in a path in graphs. Unattributed histograms are used to answer queries of the type: “How
many people belong to the k-th largest group?”. They can be far more accurate than naively adding
noise to each group and then selecting the k-th largest noisy group [18]. They are however different
from the queries used in this work as they count people rather then groups and are not necessarily
hierarchical. A substantial contribution is represented by the work of Kui et al. [20], that study
the problem of releasing hierarchical group queries that satisfies the non-negativity, integrality, and
consistency of the counts. They propose a solution that, similarly to [13], can be mapped toMrH and
apply rounding to ensure integrality, as well as studying the context of cumulative group queries.
Finally, an important deployment is represented by the TopDown algorithm [5], used by the US
Census to for the 2018 end-to-end test, in preparation for the 2020 release. The algorithm is a weaker
form of MrH that first obtains inexact noisy counts to satisfy the desired privacy level and then
alternates the following two steps for multiple levels of a geographic hierarchy, from top to bottom, as
the name suggests. The first step is a program analogous toMrH , but it operates on two consecutive
levels only. The second step is an ad-hoc rounding strategy to guarantee the integrality of the counts
while satisfying the hierarchical invariants. These two steps are repeated processing two contiguous
levels of the hierarchy until the leaves are reached.
11 Experimental Evaluation
This section evaluates the proposed privacy-preserving mechanisms for the PGSR problem. The
evaluation focuses on comparing runtime and accuracy of the mechanisms described in the paper.
Consistent with the privacy literature, accuracy is measured in term of the L1 difference between
the privacy-preserving group sizes and the original ones, i.e., given the original group sizes T “
tnr | r P Ru, and their private counterparts Tˆ , the L1-error is defined as řr }nr ´ nˆr}1. Since the
mechanisms are non-deterministic due to the noise added by the geometric mechanism, 30 instances
are generated for each benchmark and the results report average values and standard deviations. Each
mechanism is run on a single-core 2.1 GHz terminal with 24GB of RAM and is implemented in
Python 3 with Gurobi 8.1 for solving the convex quadratic optimization problems.
Mechanisms The evaluation compares the PGSR mechanismsMH , its cumulative versionMc,
and their polynomial-time dynamic-programming (DP) counterparts MdpH , Mdpc , and Mchc . The
former are referred to as OP-based methods and the latter as DP-based methods. In addition toMH
andMc, that solve the associated post-processing QIPs, the experiments evaluate the associated
relaxations, MrH and Mrc , respectively, that relax the integrality constraints (H4) and (C5) and
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Figure 7: Runtime (in seconds) at varying of the number of group size N .
rounds the solutions. still guaranteeing non-negativity and the final solutions are rounded. For
completeness, the experiments also evaluate the performance of the TopDown algorithm [5] and
the optimization-based mechanismMOPdp that does not exploit the structure of the cost function to
compute the cost tables.
Datasets The mechanisms are evaluated on three datasets.
• Census Dataset: The first dataset has 117,630,445 groups, 7,592 leaves, 305,276,358 indi-
viduals, 3 levels, and N=1,000. Individuals live in facilities, i.e., households or dormitories,
assisted living facilities, and correctional institutions. Due to privacy concerns and lack of
available methods to protect group sizes during the 2010 Decennial Census release, group
sizes were aggregated for any facility of size 8 or more (see Summary File 1 [29]). Therefore,
following [21] and starting from the truncated group sizes Census dataset, the experiments
augment the dataset with group sizes up to N=1,000 that mimic the published statistics, but
add a heavy tail to model group quarters (dormitories, correctional facilities, etc.). This was
obtained by computing the ratio r “ n7{n6 of household groups of sizes 7 and 6, subtracting
from the aggregated groups n8` M people according to the ratio r, and redistributed these
M people in groups k ą 8 so that the ratio between any two consecutive groups holds (in
expectation). Finally, 50 outliers were added, chosen uniformly in the interval between 10
and 1, 000. The region hierarchy is composed by the National level, the State levels (50
states + Puerto Rico and District of Columbia), and the Counties levels (3144 in total).
• NY Taxi Dataset: The second dataset has 13,282 groups, 3,973 leaves, 24,489,743 individ-
uals, 3 levels, and N=13,282. The 2014 NY city Taxi dataset [3] describes trips (pickups
and dropoffs) from geographical locations in NY city. The dataset views each taxi as a
group and the size of the group is the number of pickups of the taxi. The region hierarchy
has 3 levels: the entire NY city at level 1, the boroughs: Bronx, Brooklyn, EWR, Manhattan,
Queens, and Staten Island at level 2, and a total of 263 zones at level 3.
• Synthetic Dataset: Finally, to test the runtime scalability, the experiments considered
synthetic data from the NY Taxi dataset by limiting the number of group sizes N arbitrarily,
i.e., removing group sizes greater than a certain threshold.
11.1 Scalability
The first results concern the scalability of the mechanisms, which are evaluated on the synthetic
datasets for various numbers of group sizes. Figure 7 illustrates the runtimes of the algorithms at
varying of the number of group sizes N from 5 to 50 for the synthetic dataset. The experiments have
a timeout of 30 minutes and the runtime is reported in log-10 scale. The figure shows that the exact
OP-based approaches andMOPdp are not competitive, even for small groups sizes. Therefore, these
results rule out the following mechanisms:MOPdp ,MH , andMc and the remaining results focus on
comparing the relaxed versions of the OP-based mechanisms versus their proposed DP-counterparts.
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Figure 8: The Runtime for the mechanisms: Census data (left) and Taxi data (right).
11.2 Runtimes
Figure 8 reports the runtime, in seconds, for the hierarchical mechanismMrH and its DP-counterpart
MdpH , and the hierarchical cumulative mechanismMrc and its DP-counterpartMdpc , together with
Mchc and TopDown. The left figure illustrates the results for the Census data and the right one for the
NY Taxi data. The main observations can be summarized as follows:
1. Although the OP-based algorithms consider only a relaxation of the problem, the exact
DP-versions are consistently faster. In particular, MdpH is up to one order of magnitude
faster than its counterpartMr, andMdpc is up to two orders of magnitude faster than its
counterpartMrc .
2. The proposed DP-based mechanisms are always faster than the TopDown algorithm and
the newly proposed proposedMrc mechanism is up to two order of magnitude faster than
TopDown.
3. Mrc is consistently slower thenMrH . This is because, despite the fact that the two post-
processing steps have the same number of variables, theMc post-processing step has many
additional constraints of type (C3).
4. The runtime of the DP-based mechanisms decreases as the privacy budget increases, due to
the sizes of the cost tables that depend on the noise variance.2
5. The cumulative versionMdpc outperforms itsMdpH counterpart. Once again, the reason is
due to the domain sizes. In fact, due to reduced sensitivity,Mdpc applies a smaller amount
of noise than that required byMdpH to guarantee the same level of privacy and resulting in
smaller domain sizes.
6. Mchc is consistently faster thanMdpc , which results from that computing the cost tables of
the former is achieved with fewer operations than for the latter, as analyzed in Theorem 4
and Theorem 5.
11.3 Accuracy
Figure 9 reports the error induced by the mechanisms, i.e., the L1-distance between the privacy-
preserving and original datasets. The main observations can be summarized as follows:
1. The DP-based mechanisms produce more accurate results than their counterparts andMchc
dominates all other mechanisms, including TopDown.
2. As expected, the error of all mechanisms decreases as the privacy budget increases, since
the noise decreases as privacy budget increases. The errors are larger in the NY Taxi dataset,
which has a larger number of group sizes than the Census dataset.
2The implementation uses Drs“tn˜rs´δ . . . n˜rs`δu X Z`, where δ “ 3ˆ r2λ2s, i.e., 3 times the variance
associated with the double-geometrical distribution with parameter λ.
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Figure 9: The L1 errors for the algorithms: Census data (left) and Taxi data (right).
3. Finally, the results show that the cumulative mechanisms tend to concentrate the errors
on small group sizes. Unfortunately, these are also the most populated groups, and this
is true for each subregion of the hierarchy. On the other hand, the DP-based version, that
retains the integrality constraints, better redistributes the noise introduced by the geometrical
mechanism and produce substantially more accurate results.
To shed further light on accuracy, Table 7 reports a breakdown of the average errors of each mechanism
at each level of the hierarchies. MechanismMchc is clearly the most accurate. Note that the table
reports the average number of constraint violations in the output datasets. A constraint violation is
counted whenever a subtree of the hierarchy violates the PGSR consistency condition (2). Being
exact, the DP-based methods report no violations. In contrast, bothMrH andMrc report a substantial
amount of constraint violations.
12 Conclusions
The release of datasets containing sensitive information concerning a large number of individuals
is central to a number of statistical analysis and machine learning tasks. Of particular interest are
hierarchical datasets, in which counts of individuals satisfying a given property need to be released at
different granularities (e.g., the location of a household at a national, state, and county levels). The
paper discussed the Privacy-preserving Group Release (PGRP) problem and proposed an exact and
efficient constrained-based approach to privately generate consistent counts across all levels of the
Taxi Data Census Data
L1 Errors pˆ104q #CV L1 Errors pˆ103q #CV
 Alg Lev 1 Lev 2 Lev 3 Lev 1 Lev 2 Lev 3
0.1
MrH 25.4 158.7 904.4 18206 40.3 54.3 802.1 1966
MdpH 26.6 121.9 915.7 0 10.3 38.4 825.4 0Mrc 47.9 153.2 551.6 19460 23.1 64.5 632.2 1715
Mdpc 19.9 65.6 644.3 0 0.9 23.2 550.6 0
Mchc 5.5 39.3 537.8 0 0.2 13.9 603.0 0
TopDown 26.6 93.0 809.1 0 3.7 35.0 820.5 0
0.5
MrH 8.6 81.2 364.2 18591 39.4 37.9 216.3 1990
MdpH 5.5 31.0 408.9 0 2.4 9.4 230.8 0Mrc 46.7 153.5 450.7 19531 23.1 61.0 494.2 1718
Mdpc 4.0 16.4 352.9 0 0.2 5.8 159.1 0
Mchc 1.2 9.5 150.6 0 0.0 3.4 165.3 0
TopDown 5.3 20.3 242.1 0 0.9 8.6 228.4 0
1.0
MrH 7.7 77.2 279.0 18085 40.7 39.2 130.0 1989
MdpH 3.1 19.8 328.5 0 1.2 5.1 128.8 0Mrc 47.1 154.2 447.1 19706 24.1 63.0 494.5 1728
Mdpc 2.0 8.7 307.8 0 0.1 3.2 91.0 0
Mchc 0.5 4.5 78.6 0 0.0 1.7 86.9 0
TopDown 2.6 10.3 138.4 0 0.5 4.6 127.2 0
Table 7: L1-errors and constraint violations (CV) for each level of the hierarchies.
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hierarchy. This novel approach was evaluated on large, real datasets and results in speedups of up to
two orders of magnitude, as well as significant improvements in terms of accuracy with respect to
state-of-the-art techniques. Interesting avenues of future directions include exploiting different forms
of parallelism to speed up the computations of the dynamic programming-based mechanisms even
further, using, for instance, Graphical Processing Units as proposed in [14].
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A Missing Proofs
Lemma4 The sensitivity ∆n of the group estimate query is 2.
Proof. Consider a group size n (stripped of the superscript r for notation convenience) derived
by a dataset D and let n1 be the group size generated by a neighboring dataset D1 of D. Let
D1 “ D Y tpp, u, r, 1qu be the dataset that adds an individual to some group Gu, for some u P U ,
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associated with a group size ni. This action decreases the group size ni value by one and increases
the group size ni`1 value by one, i.e., n1i “ ni ` 1 and n1i`1 “ ni`1 ´ 1. Therefore }n1 ´ n}1 “ 2.
A similar argument applies to a neighboring dataset that removes an individual from D. l
Theorem1 MH satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. First note that each level of the hierarchy forms a partition over the regions inR (by definition
of hierarchy). By parallel composition (Lemma 2), for each level ` P rLs, the noisy values n˜r for
all r P R` satisfy L -differential privacy. There are exactly L levels in the hierarchy: Therefore, by
sequential composition (Lemma 1), the mechanism satisfies -differential privacy. l
Theorem2 Constructing Tˆ dp requires solving Op|R|N D¯) optimization problems given in Equa-
tion (4), where D¯ “ maxs,r |Drs | for r P R, s P rN s.
Proof. There are exactly |R|N nodes, and each node runs the program in Equation (4) for each
element of its domain Drs . l
The next lemma is the key technical result of the paper and it requires some additional notation. Let
pv0, . . . , vnq be the ordered sequence of values in Dr, i.e., vi`1 “ vi ` 1 for all i “ 0 . . . n ´ 1.
Given a cost table τ r, its associated cost function τ˚ r is a PWL function defined for all x P rv0, vns
as:
τ˚ rpxq “
$’&’%
px´ v0qpτ rpv1q ´ τ rpv0qq ` τ rpv0q if v0 ď x ă v1
px´ v1qpτ rpv2q ´ τ rpv1qq ` τ rpv1q if v1 ď x ă v2
. . .
px´ vn´1qpτ rpvnq ´ τ rpvn´1qq ` τ rpvn´1q if vn´1 ď x ď vn.
(7)
Similarly, φ˚r is the PWL function defined from φr by the same process.
Lemma5 Consider a given region r and group size s. If τ˚ cs is CPWL for all c P chprq, then φ˚rs is
CPWL.
Proof. For simplicity, the proof omits subscript s from τ˚ rs , τ
r
s , φ
r
s and φ˚
r
s. The proof also uses
ř
c
and minc to denote
ř
cPchprq and mincPchprq, respectively.
The proof is by induction on the levels in T . For the base case, consider any leaf node ar. Its cost
table τ r only uses Equation (4a) which is CPWL. Hence τ˚ r associated with τ r is CPWL. The
remainder of the proof shows that, if the statement holds for l ` 1, . . . , L, it also holds for level l.
Consider a node ar at level l. By induction, the cost function τ˚ c (c P chprq) is CPWL. Now
consider for each node c P chprq a value v0c with minimum cost, i.e., v0c “ argminv τ cpvq. As
a result, the value V 0 “ řc v0c has minimal cost φrpV 0q “ řc τ cpv0c q. Having constructed the
minimum value in cost table φr, it remains to compute the costs of all values V 0 ` k for all integer
k P r1,maxDr ´ V 0s and of all values V 0 ´ k for all integer k P r1, V 0 ´ minDrs. The proof
focuses on the values V 0 ` k since the two cases are similar.
Recall that the algorithm builds a sequence of vectors v0,v1, . . . ,vk, . . . that provides the optimal
combinations of values for φrpV 0q,φrpV 0 ` 1q, . . . ,φrpV 0 ` kq, . . .. Vector vk is obtained from
vk´1 by changing the value of a single child whose cost function has the smallest slope, i.e.,
vkc “
"
vk´1c ` 1 if c “ argminc τ cpvk´1c ` 1q ´ τ cpvk´1c q
vk´1c otherwise
(8)
Observe that, by construction, the vector v0,v1, . . . ,vk, . . . satisfy the consistency constraints (4c)
for φrpV 0q,φrpV 0 ` 1q, . . . ,φrpV 0 ` kq, . . ., since only one element is added at each step.
The next part of the proof is by induction on k and shows that vk is the optimal solution for
φrpV 0 ` kq for k ě 0. The base case k “ 0 follows by construction. Assume that vk is the optimal
solution of τ rpV 0 ` kq. The proof shows that vk`1 is optimal for τ rpV 0 ` k ` 1q. Without loss of
generality, assume that the first child (c1) is selected in (8). It follows that for c ‰ c1,
τ c1pvkc1 ` 1q ´ τ c1pvkc1q ď τ cpvkc ` 1q ´ τ cpvkc q.
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The proof is by contradiction and assumes that there exists an optimal solution v˚ such that
ř
c vc˚ “
V 0 ` k ` 1 and φrpv˚q ă φrpvkq. There are three cases to consider:
1. vc˚1 “ vkc1 ` 1: Let v` be the vector defined by vc`1 “ vc˚1 ´ 1, vc` “ vc˚ pc ‰ c1q. v`
satisfies the consistency constraint for V 0 ` k. Since φrpv˚q ă φrpvkq, by hypothesis and
vc˚1 “ vkc1 ` 1, it follows that
ř
c τ
cpvc˚ q ă
ř
c τ
cpvkc q. But since vc`1 “ vkc1 , it follows that
φrpv`q ă φrpvkq which contradicts the optimality of vk.
2. vc˚1 ą vkc1 ` 1: By optimality of vk and v˚, the following properties hold:
τ c1pvkc1q `
ÿ
c‰c1
τ cpvkc q ď τ c1pvc˚1 ´ 1q `
ÿ
c‰c1
τ cpvc˚ q (P1)
τ c1pvkc1 ` 1q `
ÿ
c‰c1
τ cpvkc q ą τ c1pvc˚1q `
ÿ
c‰c1
τ cpvc˚ q (P2)
Subtracting (P1) from (P2) gives
τ c1pvkc1 ` 1q ´ τ c1pvkc1q ą τ c1pvc˚1q ´ τ c1pvc˚1 ´ 1q
which is impossible since vc˚1 ą vkc1 ` 1 and τ˚ c1 is CPWL.
3. vc˚1 ă vkc1 ` 1: The optimality of v˚ implies that
τ c1pvc˚1q `
ÿ
c‰c1
τ cpvc˚ q ă τ c1pvkc1 ` 1q `
ÿ
c‰c1
τ cpvkc q (P3)
Since vc˚1 ă vkc1 ` 1, there exists a child c2 such that vc˚2 ą vk2 . (P3) can be rewritten as
τ c1pvc˚1q`τ c2pvc˚2q`
ÿ
c‰c1,c2
τ cpvc˚ q ă τ c1pvkc1 ` 1q`τ c2pvkc2q`
ÿ
c‰c1,c2
τ cpvkc q. (P4)
The optimality of vk implies that
τ c1pvc˚1q`τ c2pvc˚2 ´ 1q`
ÿ
c‰c1,c2
τ cpvc˚ q ě τ c1pvkc1q`τ c2pvkc2q`
ÿ
c‰c1,c2
τ cpvkc q. (P5)
Substracting (P5) from (P4) gives
τ c2pvc˚2q ´ τ c2pvc˚2 ´ 1q ă τ c1pvkc1 ` 1q ´ τ c1pvkc1q.
Since vc˚2 ą vkc2 and τ˚ c2 is CPWL, it follows that
τ c2pvkc2 ` 1q ´ τ c2pvkc2q ă τ c1pvc˚1 ` 1q ´ τ c1pvc˚1q
which contradicts the selection of c1 in the algorithm.
It remains to show that the resulting function φ˚r is convex, i.e.,
@k ě 0 : φ˚rpV 0 ` k ` 2q ´ φ˚rpV 0 ` k ` 1q ě φ˚rpV 0 ` k ` 1q ´ φ˚rpV 0 ` kq (9)
Let ck be the child selected when computing φ˚rpV 0 ` kq in Equation (8). By selection of ck,
@c : τ ckpvkck ` 1q ´ τ ckpvkckq ď τ cpvkc ` 1q ´ τ cpvkc q.
Since τ˚ c is CPWL, it follows that
τ ckpvkck ` 1q ´ τ ckpvkckq ď τ cpvkc ` i` 1q ´ τ cpvkc ` iq
for all i ě 0. The results follows by induction. l
Theorem3 The cost table τ rs is CPWL.
Proof. By Lemma 5, φrs is CPWL. The function dpvq def“ pv ´ n˜rsq2 also defines a CPWL. The result
follows from the fact that the sum of two CPWL functions is CPWL. l
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Theorem4 Algorithm 1 requires requires O
`
D¯ log D¯
˘
operations, where D¯ “ maxs,r D¯rs for
r P R, s P rN s.
The result above can be derived observing that the runtime complexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated
by the sorting operations in lines 1 and 2.
Lemma6 The sensitivity ∆c of the cumulative group estimate query is 1.
Proof. Consider a vector of cumulative group sizes c “ pc1, . . . , cnq. Additional, let c1 be a vector
of cumulative group sizes that differs from c by adding one individual to a group of size k P rns. It
follows that c1k “ ck´1 but none of the other groups c1i changes: i.e., c1i “ ci, for all i ‰ k. Similarly,
removing one individual from a group of size k implies that c1k`1 “ ck`1 ` 1 and c1i “ ci, for all
i ‰ k.
Therefore, for maximal change between any two neighboring datasets c and c1 is 1. l
Lemma7 The cost table τi of each node ai of T ch is CPWL.
Proof. Like Lemma 5, we prove this argument by induction. For the base case, consider the head
node a1 of T ch. Its cost table is simply given by τ1pvq “ pv ´ c˜1q2 for any v P D1 and proves to be
CPWL due to convexity of L2-Norm.
Suppose that the cost table τi is CPWL. If the nodes ai and ai`1 are at the same level, there exists an
inequality constraint between the post-processed values of these two adjoining nodes, ai and ai`1.
Thus, the function φi`1pvq is given in the following formula.
φi`1pvq “ min
xiPDi
xiďv
τipxiq “
"
τipv0i q if v ě v0i
τipvq otherwise,
where the value v0i represents the minimizer of the cost table τi, i.e., v
0
i :“ argminvPDi τipvq. If
follows that the function φi`1pvq is CPWL. In the other case, an equality constraint is between the
two post-processed values, which indicates that the function φi`1pvq is simply the cost table τipvq
and, thus, CPWL. Therefore, for both cases, the function φi`1pvq is shown to be CPWL. Recall that
the function dpvq def“ pv ´ c˜i`1q2 also defines a CPWL. It follows that the cost table τi`1 enjoys the
property of CPWL as well due to the fact that the sum of two CPWL functions is CPWL. l
Theorem5 The cost table τi for each i P r|R|N s can be computed in time O
`
D¯
˘
, where D¯ “
maxi |Di| for i P r|R|N s.
Proof. Consider the head node a1 of the hierarchy T ch. It takes O
`
D¯
˘
operations to compute the cost
table τ1 and identify its minimizer v01 via linear search. Given the cost table τi and its associated
minimizer v0i , we are able to generate the function φi`1pvq in O
`
D¯
˘
, regardless of the type of the
constraint between the two adjoining nodes, ai and ai`1. Thus, we can update the cost table τi`1
and and compute its minimizer v0i`1 in O
`
D¯
˘
, for any i P r|R|N ´ 1s. l
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